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Abstract 
The growing alarm in New Zealand over the development of a visible ‘underclass’ is 
underpinned by a wider concern in the face of the country’s dramatic relative decline 
in the postwar period. In the generation after 1945, New Zealand was said to have 
‘full employment’, the third highest standard of living in the world and an enviable 
record in the area of free education to university level. According to a popular self-
image, and a central plank of New Zealand national identity, the country was 
egalitarian and universally prosperous. The development of an underclass, by 
contrast, seems to indicate that this former British colony at the edge of empires could 
not protect itself against the tide of international neo-liberalism. However the view 
that an underclass has suddenly appeared does not take into account of factors which 
always prevailed against the notion of social equality and inclusiveness—that, for 
example, most married women were not in education, employment or training in New 
Zealand in 1950; or that the indigenous New Zealanders, the Maori, only began to 
enter paid employment in a systematic way as they urbanized. This article 
concentrates upon the shadow which New Zealand’s egalitarian reputation casts 
upon the terrain of labour historiography. For, a national identity based upon the 
idea of egalitarianism is now the most difficult issue New Zealand labour historians 
face. 
 
New Zealand and its egalitarian reputation 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the settler colony evolved into 
an infant nation, New Zealand gained the reputation as a ‘social laboratory’ where 
experimental, progressive policies were implemented for the western world to watch 
and emulate. The country’s reputation was global, influencing liberals and ‘the Left’ 
in the United States, Great Britain and elsewhere.2 The evolving application of social 
experimentation actually occurred in two distinct phases and periods.3 During the first 
of these, from 1890 to 1912, the farthest of Britain’s colonies was said to be leading 
the world in creating a modern, inclusivist liberal democracy. This initial foray into 
the manufacturing of a new politics occurred with a Liberal government at the helm.4 
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The second phase, from 1939 to 1945, which was more emphatic, saw the first Labour 
government construct a political consensus around the ‘cradle to grave’ welfare state 
that was required to ensure the endurance of egalitarianism.  
The nature of these two forward movements will readily bring to the minds of 
a British audience the comparisons with the exertions of British Liberal and Labour 
parties at about the same time. However, New Zealand led in both periods: in the first 
phase, constructing a skeletal social state, and in the second forging ahead in the 
development of a package of reforms that Britain would itself pursue from 1945-
1950/1, under Clement Atlee’s first majority Labour government.5 
 New Zealanders, like Britons, saw connections between the two periods, 
although the reforming imperatives differed. Michael Joseph Savage, the first Labour 
Prime Minister, underscored the temporal link when he declared that his government 
‘intend[ed] to begin where Richard John Seddon [Liberal Prime Minister 1893-1906] 
and his colleagues left off’; his aim was to create a prosperous ‘nation of free people 
in the southern seas’.6 In part, New Zealanders were trying to protect what they had; 
unlike in Britain, there was no crisis of ‘national efficiency’ or health, no 
reconsideration of the nation’s direction in the wake of a trying military struggle 
against a colonial people, to spark off the early Liberal reforms; or at least New 
Zealand had no such concerns within its white, settler (Pakeha) society.7 Since the 
period of mass settlement, New Zealand was often described as a ‘workers’ paradise’; 
its working people were said to be more wealthy per capita, and its social and political 
cultures more egalitarian, than Britain and the United States between 1893 and 1939. 
Much later, in 1953, it was said to have the third highest living standard in the world.8 
Even though the population was small (816,000 in 1901 rising to 1,702,000 in 1945) 
its workers became affluent. No state has been completely egalitarian but New 
Zealand is said to have come closest, achieving social equality and classlessness on 
the basis of consensus and fairness.9 
 New Zealand’s record as a trend-setting centre of egalitarianism was 
publicized overseas in a number of ways. One key source was the government-
produced New Zealand Official Year-Books. First published in 1893, these were 
widely distributed, with half of them—between 2000 and 3500—sent overseas. New 
Zealand’s colonists were proud and competitive; they did not publish material which 
would detract from the story of progress. Instead, they portrayed New Zealand as a 
closely-knit, settled and stable agrarian nation. Factors such as female suffrage 
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(1893), state-instituted compulsory conciliation and arbitration, state intervention in 
the promotion of settlement and modest land redistribution (1894) and an old age 
pension (1898) were all themes for emphasis. Up to 1914, the Year-Books stressed an 
impressive Liberal record.10 
 The social programmes of New Zealand were also sponsored, around the turn 
of the twentieth century, by a stream of foreign visitors.11 Sydney and Beatrice Webb 
being the first among many to visit the South Seas Utopia.12 Radical Britons such as 
James Keir Hardie, Tom Mann and Ben Tillett publicised their New Zealand visits.13 
Visitors from the USA, such as Victor S. Clark, Henry Demarest Lloyd and Robert 
Rives La Monte, did the same.14 Governments also commissioned comparisons with 
New Zealand. The British Home Secretary commissioned Ernest Aves’ to report on 
New Zealand’s experimental legislation.15 Harris Weinstock was appointed to 
consider New Zealand, as a Special Labor Commissioner for California.16 The French 
Labor Bureau commissioned Albert Métin, later a Minister of Labour in the pre-war 
French government, to do the same.17 Leftist support for the idea of egalitarianism 
was crucial. A series of enthusiastic articles about New Zealand reform in Robert 
Blatchford’s Clarion helped to lure not only British labour leaders to New Zealand 
but also 190 ‘Clarionette’ settlers who formed branches of the New Zealand Socialist 
Party in 1901.18 New Zealand’s political and social reforms had made New Zealand a 
‘socialist Canaan’. The inspiration behind the ‘Clarionettes’, William Ranstead, 
proclaimed that: 
 
Here there is no aristocracy, no snobbery. There are no very rich people and 
no poor. I’ve not met a beggar … or seen one destitute person. There are no 
slums here, no miserable starving women and no suffering children. Here no 
sober, industrious man need lack any of the comforts of life.19 
 
New Zealanders based in the Old World played a role in promoting New 
Zealand’s standing, too. Foremost was William Pember Reeves, the first Minister of 
Labour, 1891 to 1896, and later Agent-General in London and Director of the London 
School of Economics. He popularised the term ‘social laboratory’ to describe New 
Zealand in a series of publications.20 
 New Zealand’s reputation in this regard continued to be publicized 
internationally in the later period. A new generation of ‘outside’ social commentators 
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concentrated upon New Zealanders’ relative equality and material prosperity. George 
Bernard Shaw regarded New Zealand as a place that was implementing the Fabian 
Socialist programme he and others advocated.21 Leslie Lipson was appointed to the 
inaugural chair in political science at Victoria University of Wellington in 1938 and 
just before he left nine years later, he published a sustained account of New Zealand 
as a country without the extremes of poverty and wealth, a high standard of living and 
fairly evenly-spread opportunities.22 
The state remained involved in the construction of the ideas about New 
Zealand’s egalitarian history under Labour. The Labour government established the 
New Zealand National Film Unit (1941), which began sending short feature films 
overseas, particularly to international film festivals.23 Postwar films were particularly 
strong on the government policy of assimilation and racial harmony. Reels like the 
‘Meet New Zealand’ (1949) reinforced the idea of New Zealand as a good, safe and 
healthy place to raise children. It was a land of equality and opportunity under the 
Labour government’s social welfare system, particularly considering its education 
provisions which extended free education from primary to secondary school and then 
to university for any student who passed a university entrance examination. This 
message of inclusiveness and fairness was at the heart of the government publications 
around the 1940 centennial, including the New Zealand Encyclopedia, which the 
Second Labour government approved in 1959. Over 31,000 copies of which were sold 
were within three months of its publication in 1966. R.M. Burdon wrote the 
Encyclopedia entry on the ‘Characteristics of New Zealand Society’, arguing that, 
above all, it was a society with the egalitarian ideal at its centre which strove for 
equality of opportunity, particularly in its education system.24  
 Egalitarianism, then, was a powerful notion in governing circles. It was no less 
influential upon historians. Yet the worker’s paradise, the ‘social laboratory’, sought 
out by many white settlers and social commentators in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century society was also a place of evolving class hierarchies and of 
significant gender and racial divisions. Before unpacking the egalitarian myth, 
however, we must survey its impact on New Zealand’s historiography. 
 
The historiography of egalitarianism and its sudden demise 
Alongside the egalitarian ideal, it has become commonplace to believe that the term 
class had no place in New Zealand—that it was an inappropriate borrowing which 
5 
applied to other societies, but not New Zealand.25 Related to this, a dominant thread in 
country’s history has been the belief that urban, industrial, and class models of social 
organisation are irrelevant to New Zealand’s unique situation.26 Marxist industrial 
models were considered to belong to the most advanced capitalist societies; New 
Zealand was instead construed as provincial and egalitarian.27 This idea was 
underpinned by the fact that it had a high floor for the poor and a low ceiling for the 
wealthy. High levels of property ownership (limited political organization of a 
plutocracy), universal education (from 1877) and state intervention in industrial 
disputes (from 1894), and a culture of small workplaces (meaning limited 
industrialisation and capital accumulation) were all held to be more apposite to the 
New Zealand experience. Moreover, there were also high levels of transience (with 
people moving around in regular and rhythmic cycles) and mixed residential patterns. 
For these reasons New Zealand historians have emphasised social osmosis rather than 
social division.28 In so doing they have focused on the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries when the egalitarian society was forged. In the 1970s and 1980s, perhaps a 
dozen essays were written on this issue—a veritable debate by New Zealand 
standards—with the prevailing view that class was, perhaps, at most, pertinent to city 
life, a sub-culture but not a norm.29  
 For the most part, even in regard to its cities in the twentieth century, New 
Zealand historians have concentrated upon egalitarianism, or the pursuit of 
egalitarianism, with New Zealand’s political class held to have focused upon a 
consensual quest for social security. Left-inclined historians, from Pember Reeves to 
Keith Sinclair and Bill Sutch, together emphasized the two periods in which New 
Zealand was a progressive society, just as Savage, the Labour Prime Minister had 
done, in 1935.30 The Liberal-Labour government policy constituted New Zealand as a 
‘social laboratory’ at the turn of the 20th century, while the first Labour government 
1935-1949 instituted the welfare state.31 The common aim, as Erik Olssen, New 
Zealand’s premier Labour historian, suggested, was ‘stable employment, material 
security for all and to recreate a community’.32 
 The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (I C and A) Act (1894) was the 
crowning glory of the Liberal’s industrial policy. The Act established the Arbitration 
Court and a process resulting in legally-binding industrial awards. It established a 
system that lasted 100 years until replacement by the Employment Contracts Act 
(ECA) in 1991.33 Francis Castles has described the resulting New Zealand system 
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(and Australian, too, for all its governments adopted the same industrial legislation 
between 1895 and 1916) as a unique wage-earners’ state which embraced protective 
tariffs, centralised and compulsory wage-fixing, and promoted a residual welfare state 
unique among Western countries.34 Welfare measures were ‘residual’ (as opposed to 
‘universal’) in that the compulsory wage-fixing system delivered social protection 
through a minimum living wage, a relatively compressed wage structure with a high 
degree of uniformity in wage increases, and a relatively high standard of living. 
Others have gone further to suggest not only a state-created system but a social 
contract developed upon the basis of a social consensus over continual progress, 
class harmony and egalitarianism.35 
 Yet, even during the high age of egalitarianism there were constraints upon 
certain groups. For one thing, it was crucial to have a job in the wage-earners’ welfare 
state. The male breadwinner wage was the foundation stone of the wage system, both 
as a concrete institution and as an abstract concept.36 The Arbitration Court set a 
breadwinner wage to be paid to men on the assumption that they were supporting a 
wife and two or (after 1936) three children.37 Women were regarded as not having 
dependants; consequently it was considered acceptable to pay them less than men. 
Justice Henry Higgins of the Australian federal Arbitration Court gave the male 
breadwinner wage its most famous definition for all of Australasia in his 1907 
‘Harvester Judgement’: that the basic wage should be sufficient to support a family of 
five in frugal comfort.38 Full employment for white males was achieved through 
controlled immigration, import restrictions and tariff protections. Castles argues that 
the Australasian states afforded high wages, jobs for all men who wanted them, and 
economic and political stability up to the late 1960s, albeit with a blip during the 
Depression.39 Benefits were extended to some of those who could not be employed in 
jobs that were paid at the ‘decent’ arbitrated rates. Castles argues that the emphasis of 
male breadwinning was not merely the result of a strong labour movement ‘capturing’ 
Parliament, but, more importantly, because Labour’s ideals had broad popular support 
arising out of a colonial system in which wages were compressed at foundation with 
unskilled workers able to command high basic rates.  
 Another important issue, one tackled by a team of historians at Otago 
University, led by Erik Olssen, has been the importance of ‘handicraft’ production in 
society between 1880 and 1920. In the ‘Caversham project’ (named after the Dunedin 
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suburb which was the laboratory of investigation), the largest social and labour 
history project ever undertaken in New Zealand, the central premise was that workers 
performed skilled tasks and controlled the labour process. Production was local and 
small-scale, with blurred lines (or no lines at all) between skilled and unskilled labour 
and ownership. Craft ‘cut across the grain of class’, and mutual support was strong in 
the resulting culture.40 Skilled men mobilised for political action from the Long 
Depression of the late nineteenth century and the collapse of the trans-Tasman 
Maritime Strike in 1890. They constructed an ideology centred on the dignity of 
labour and on mutualism, around which a nation-wide political consensus eventually 
developed. Pressure grew for the government to provide employment in ‘undiluted’ 
skilled trades (that is, trades from which women and the untrained were excluded), 
and to guarantee regular work for men at rates of pay sufficient to support their 
families.41 Skilled urban workers won political power in Caversham; then, after the 
formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1916, they won support from the 
whole country for the urban labour’s agenda in 1935. 
 Most historians have regarded the 1935 Labour Government as part of a 
longer-term political, legislative or labour process. It succeeded in instituting social 
protection and ‘cradle to grave’ welfare in the Indian summer of New Zealand’s 
social laboratory. The stated object of the 1938 Social Security Act was to end 
poverty in New Zealand by providing pensions, by ensuring a reasonable standard of 
living for those not in paid employment and by providing free health system to all. 
But the state also attended to employment and to wider economic security. The 
government instituted compulsory unionism in 1936 with union membership 
increasing threefold between 1935 and 1938, from 81,000 to 249,000. The 
government played a key role in creating a peak union organization, the New Zealand 
Federation of Labour in 1937.42 The 1936 Employment Promotion Act aimed to 
provide ‘full-time’ employment and, at the same time, the government implemented 
extensive public works and house-construction programmes. Between 1948 and 1955, 
for instance, the average number of registered unemployed did not exceed 100 
individuals, and significant unemployment did not re-emerge until after 1967. 
However, 1935 was not a sudden turning point; most historians recently have 
emphasized a gradualist approach in social provision.43 
 The government’s education programme is a case in point. It was designed to 
be universal and to promote opportunity and egalitarianism. Yet previous 
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governments had done much. The 1877 Education Act provided free, secular and 
compulsory primary education to all New Zealanders aged up to age thirteen. By 
1900, fewer than ten per cent of New Zealand’s population went to secondary school. 
Seddonian Liberalism instituted technical education and the first free places at 
secondary school from 1903. But it was the 1935 Labour government which made 
secondary schooling free and compulsory. The stirring words attributed to Peter 
Fraser’s from the 1930s still resonate:  
  
The Government’s objective, broadly expressed, is that every person, 
whatever his level of academic ability, whether he be rich or poor, whether he 
live in town or country, has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind 
for which he is best suited and to the fullest extent of his powers.44 
 
After making secondary school compulsory for students up to fifteen years of age in 
1944, the numbers at such schools doubled: from 47134 to 111,441 over a fifteen-year 
year period.45 Budgetary investment trebled: the first Labour Government’s education 
budget rose from £3.3 million in 1936; £4.2 in 1938-9, £5.6 million in 1940, and £11 
million in 1949-50. Government expenditure on education made up 18 to 19.4 per 
cent of all government spending, second only to the outlay on defence and war in 
Labour’s administration.46  
 In the 1950s and 1960s New Zealand’s working class is said to have become 
affluent adopting middle-class values and lifestyles. New Zealand had the third 
highest standard of living in the world and the highest per capita number of cars, 
telephones and radios. New Zealand’s society was democratic, mobile and open. That 
is, governments which had aspired to delivering egalitarianism had succeeded. After 
World War II, according to Wolfgang Rosenberg, the country achieved the ‘miracle 
of continuous full employment’, and universality in many of its social security 
benefits, ‘particularly in superannuation and children’s allowances’.47 New Zealand 
became a relatively egalitarian country, according to Sutch and Lipson.48 New 
Zealand was relatively safe, peaceful, democratic and economically developed. 
Governments had popular support and there was a political consensus. However, the 
system could not be sustained. 
 Indeed, it was all downhill from the 1960s and 1970s. The world economy 
changed. The oil shocks shattered the New Zealand economy. Britain’s entry into the 
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EEC (1973), exerting a powerful, negative influence on the New Zealand agriculture 
economy which had grown used to feeding huge markets in the former imperial 
motherland. Unemployment and budget deficiencies began rising. There were also 
internal destabilizers too, and under the influence of neo-liberalism, the Fourth 
Labour government (1984-1990) floated the dollar, phased out import restrictions and 
generally deregulated the economy. A change of government, however, saw no 
change in policies. The ECA (1991) destroyed the century-old industrial system, and 
collective organization plummeted. Union density had been 50 per cent in the 1950s. 
During the 1990s the movement declined: from 35 per cent of wage and salary 
earners being union members in 1991 to just 21 per cent in 1999.49 Welfare cuts in 
1991 and the removal of public housing subsidies left the poorest New Zealanders an 
estimated 20 to 25 per cent worse off. Living standards plummeted. New Zealand’s 
place on the economic rankings slipped from third place in 1954 to around 20th on 
GDP per capita by 1999.50 In 2006, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark, 
described New Zealand’s ‘modern history’ to the London School of Economics as 
 
…one of relative decline. From the contentment and prosperity of the early 
1950s, New Zealand failed to innovate and renew its economy and 
institutions. Change when it came from 1984 lacked balance, produced 
growing inequity, failed to deliver a turnabout, and lacked popular support.51  
 
Indeed, most commentators since the 1970s have concentrated upon the eclipse of 
New Zealand’s traditional equality.52 Sociologists have concentrated on ‘[t]he myth of 
classlessness’ as ‘one of New Zealand’s central myths about itself’ which needed to 
be revised.53 New Zealand ‘is, was and should be’ an egalitarian society, with high 
social mobility: in sum, a classless society’.54 Micro-studies showed a mid-nineteenth 
century ‘model’ of ‘structural inequality and inter-personal egalitarianism’ which 
gave way to less egalitarianism and less occupational mobility after 1960s. A raft of 
studies about the wealth disparities in New Zealand appeared from the 1990s. Finally, 
lists of New Zealand’s wealthy and atlases of New Zealand’s deprived were 
published.55 
 The popular media in particular set about unpicking the myths of 
egalitarianism, classlessness and consensus by focusing on the existence of an 
underclass.56 This underclass was first portrayed as an underclass of social welfare 
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recipients, and it was feminized when the spotlight was put on solo mothers and 
welfare dependency. In February Jenny Shipley’s government distributed 1.4 million 
copies of the public discussion document which focused on solo mothers and welfare 
dependency, Towards a Code of Social and Family Responsibility. This was one to 
every New Zealand householder. The New Zealand public made 94,000 formal 
responses. However it was John Key’s ‘State of the Nation Speech’ on 30 January 
2007 that focused directly on a growing underclass and a ‘dangerous drift to social 
and economic exclusion’.57  
Sometimes the New Zealand underclass has been portrayed as a group not so 
much poor and simply less affluent: for example, renters—those unable to buy a 
house.58 Recently the underclass has been described as more like its equivalent in 
larger, post-industrial societies: a hungry underclass, a variation of child poverty, a 
fundamental challenge to the myth that New Zealand is a great place to bring up 
children.59 But lurking within the discussion is a racial dimension, as the recent 
discussion of Maori boys’ lack of educational achievement suggests.60 Russell Bishop 
indicated that 53 per cent of Maori boys left school in 2005 without educational 
qualifications compared to 20 per cent of non-Maori boys. Maori were ‘under-
educated, under-employed and underpaid’.61 Yet the media seems preoccupied with 
exposing the myth of New Zealand’s classless society by concentrating on the 
underclass in its many variations. The demythologizing has focused on contemporary 
society, or at least from the 1970s. New Zealand commentators have adopted the 
language of elsewhere.  
For a New Zealand labour historian this discussion is ironic because, for so 
long class was regarded a foreign term unrelated to New Zealand’s reality. And while 
the reality has changed, the historians have been slow to follow suit. An article in the 
country’s leading journal recently observed that ‘class has [now] virtually disappeared 
from New Zealand historiography’. Instead, historians have noted that gender and 
race dominate.62 Moreover, work on gender rarely considers the relationship between 
gender and class.63 Of course one of the problems is that there are few labour 
historians, as one survey of labour history in New Zealand noted: ‘fashionable 
perspectives have tended to draw the historical academic away from labour history’ 
and ‘there are few practicing labour historians and they largely work in isolation’.64 
As a result there are many gaps in New Zealand’s historiography.  
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New Zealand’s past egalitarianism is assumed in the recent studies on New 
Zealand’s underclass. More than that: the recent work on a New Zealand underclass 
has served more generally to make the pre-1970s period appear even more egalitarian. 
There is no classic New Zealand study to match Australia’s Struggletown which 
examines a working-class community from 1900 to 1965.65 Most of New Zealand’s 
labour historiography has concentrated on the period from the 1880s to the 1930s.66 It 
emphasizes the progressive development of New Zealand’s working class, its relative 
universal affluence and the egalitarian context. The present interest in class does not 
seem set to be applied to the past; it is a present concern only. In particular the brown 
and female underclass is assumed to be a recent invention. So the question is begged. 
Was the past so golden? Is the present so bleak? Was there consensus in the past 
where there is only contemporary debate and inequality? 
 
Three aspects of a ‘golden past’? 
By comparison with many settler societies, and most ‘Old World’ societies, New 
Zealand historical enjoyed greater equalities than most. Yet there were barriers to 
absolute equality, and these were not simply drunkenness, litigation, lack of initiative, 
depression, unemployment, atomization or the combination of such things discussed 
in Miles Fairburn path-breaking study, The Ideal Society and its Enemies. In more 
general terms, the taming of the frontier did not simply lead to a society of individuals 
of equal status. There was social inequality and lack of consensus and contentment at 
the very times that egalitarianism was said to be at its peak. There is no space here for 
an alternative history; but we must contradict the trend of labour historiography by 
stressing the limits of social equality, classlessness and consensus before the 1970s. 
These contradictions have been neglected in the egalitarian tradition. The Liberal’s 
democratic consensus, Labour’s popular full employment and the postwar social, 
political and economic homogeneity were all compromised. The 1913 Great Strike, 
family allowance (1926) and benefit (1946) and the post-war white-collar and 
professional revolutions revealed the extent of division and segmentation in society. 
Indeed, under-classes have long been part of the New Zealand which slipped through 
the nets of arbitration, welfare and employment systems. 
  
The social ‘laboratory’  
12 
In reality, the Liberal social contract soon gave way to debate and criticism. The 
Great Strike (1913) is a case in point. Until recently the wave of strikes that struck 
New Zealand at this time have been seen as industrial disputes, albeit the most violent 
in New Zealand’s history whose origins are to be found in discontent with the 
Arbitration Court particularly from about 1906. Of course 1913 was an industrial 
dispute which the workers lost. In the process armed mounted specials, ‘Massey’s 
Cossacks’ (named after the then Prime Minister Bill Massey), were deployed for 
crowd control. The Great Strike was more than an industrial dispute. It was a battle 
over democracy, over the shape of civil society in the country; and this struggle, and 
the related dialogue, especially had to include workers. Groups engaged in the battle 
because they perceived growing inequality. 
 In political terms, New Zealand was ‘born modern’.67 It was ‘the last country 
in the world to be settled by humankind’ and ‘the first to introduce full democracy’.68 
The suffrage milestones are easy to reel off: elected parliaments from 1856, secret 
ballot from 1870, adult male suffrage from 1881, payment of members from 1886, 
adult female suffrage, both Maori and Pakeha, 1893.69 But while ‘universal suffrage’ 
was granted in 1893 for Maori and Pakeha, women could not stand for parliament 
until 1919, Maori voted differently from Pakeha without secret ballot, and there was 
the country quota (a 28 per cent weighting to rural political seats) until 1945.70 In 
1911 legislation added 50 per cent to the number eligible to vote in local ratepayer 
elections.  
 Amid these changes, people were thinking about representation, change and 
political society. As suffrage was extended there was a debate within the labour 
movement between strategies of democratic centralism and participant democracy and 
a range of views lying somewhere in between. That is, was parliamentary democracy 
‘true democracy’? Would it not be better to have everyone organised into unions, or 
to have branches of One Big Union? New Zealand did not have a constitution. A 
broad range of questions of representation were widely raised, particularly 
proportional representation and referendum. There was a fluid and vibrant debate 
about the nature of society and its possibilities up to World War I.  
In 1913, the general public repudiated both democratic centralism and the 
extreme right (and the latter is important). Ideas of democratic centralism were 
rejected as emphatically as was the militant unionism (the Industrial Workers of the 
World) or industrial—as opposed to political—unionism. The consensus was, for 
13 
varying reasons, to support parliamentary democracy. It was a pivotal moment in 
twentieth century New Zealand’s history when the consensus for the Liberal’s ‘social 
laboratory’ collapsed. 
The year 1913 is a moment when, looking back, we can see evidence of class 
consciousness within the ‘social laboratory’. Class consciousness was expressed in 
spontaneous and organized support for the strike and there was a battle in the 
workplace around the turn of the twentieth century. New capitalism gave unskilled 
workers in larger workplaces a new strategic position. Transnational networks also 
came into play, promoted by the formation of political parties from the Socialist Party 
in 1901 and independent labour parties from 1904. At the same time working people’s 
opportunities were constrained as they found it harder to own the ‘small 
independencies’ (a business, a shop or a farm). Expectations were rising. There was, 
after all, a Royal Commission on the Cost of Living in 1912.71 A cohort of New 
Zealand-born (albeit that their leaders were often foreign-born) craft workers and 
international socialists came of age. These parochial workers united in ‘a reaction to 
‘negative referents’, racist and sexist ‘scapegoats helped unite the working class -
Chinese immigrations and working women’.72 Certainly New Zealand went from 
being a social laboratory, ‘a country without strikes from 1890 to 1906’, to a world 
leader in the pursuance of a General Strike in less than a decade. Some young men 
working in unskilled jobs gained a vision of a new world that did not rate ‘the social 
laboratory’. 
 But how many felt, or acted, this way? Surely the majority were happy in the 
‘social laboratory’? Was there not a political consensus despite the rise of the 
(minority) left or the (minority) right? The working class was certainly not united. 
The New Zealand working class was never monolithic. The militant unionists did not 
control or dominate the workers. The events of 1913 were as much about those who 
opposed industrial unionism as it is about the militants. The Independent Labourites 
and the liberal socialists were not moderate in their opposition to the militants or their 
ideas. And ideas are very important in 1913. 
Jack McCullough, Workers’ Representative on the Arbitration Court (WRAC) 
in New Zealand (1908-1921), offers us a perspective on this issue. McCullough was a 
trade unionist, a founder of the Christchurch Socialist Church, a New Zealand Labour 
Party activist, a journalist who wrote a weekly column, a pacifist, a parliamentary 
candidate, and ultimately a Member of the New Zealand Legislative Council. We gain 
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a window into his world through the remarkable 250,000-word diary he kept from 
1907, when he was elected the WRAC, until 1921, when he resigned his position. 
McCullough was the epitome of the skilled artisans of New Zealand whose subculture 
Olssen examined in his studies of Caversham. McCullough, and his ilk, offer essential 
insights into the politicisation of the New Zealand working-class as it founded trade 
unions, labour parties, and contributed to labour winning electoral power. But 
McCullough and his coterie certainly did not epitomize that class. The did not support 
the militants—at their peak, the militants or Red Feds constituted 15,000-17,000 
mostly unskilled workers out of a total membership of 67,000 unionists, that is, a fifth 
to a quarter.73 McCullough was aware that international socialists were growing in 
number but were not (and might never become) a majority among New Zealand 
workers. Similarly he was a pacifist but realised that most workers were not and that 
conscription should take second place to wages in the Labour Representation 
Committee’s (LRC’s) platform. The diary is not only about the constant debate 
between the left-wing factions. 
 But the debate was not simply over a majority being for arbitration and a 
militant minority being against it, the Red Feds against the Liberals. One of the many 
hats that McCullough wore was that he was President of the Farm Labourers’ Union 
(FLU) before sitting on the bench of the Arbitration Court. He and Jim Thorn used to 
ride their bikes across the Canterbury Plains recruiting farm labourers to join the 
union, irritating the farmers in the process. They called it plough-chasing. The farm 
labourers had miserable working conditions. In 1908 the FLU took a case to the 
Arbitration Court, and lost. So, too, did the Domestic Servants.74 Both they, and 
others, found that the Liberal’s ‘Social Laboratory’ innovations were limited. Welfare 
was relatively tightly-drawn.75 The claim of breaking up of the large estates was 
exaggerated—although, ironically, the Liberals broke up the greatest estate of them 
all: Maori land.76 Everyone refers to the importance of the arbitration system in 
creating a minimum wage and equalising working conditions but it only applied to a 
minority of workers until 1936.  
 A study of McCullough’s diary shows the neglected importance of a wide 
ranging working-class associational life and it shows wide-ranging discontent with 
the ‘social laboratory’—its welfare, labour and land policies. His family shows further 
evidence.77 Jack’s brother, Jim, for instance, was a long-standing member of the 
Oddfellows. Fifteen per cent of adult males were friendly society members in 1901. 
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The bases of most of the New Zealand friendly societies were ideas of co-operative 
thrift mostly on the basis of Christian ideas. Friendly societies were an important 
stepping-stone towards the welfare state. They flourished during the period of the 
social laboratory: membership grew between 1887 and 1914 from just under 9 per 
cent to 22.5 per cent of adult males.78 Indeed, they more numerous than trade 
unionists.79 A working class signing up for private insurance is another indication of 
the dissatisfaction with the Liberal’s social laboratory and also meant that there was a 
privileged group within the working class who had access, especially to 
unemployment benefits that others did not. The central claim that the Liberals did 
more than other governments to promote egalitarianism is not at issue, but the extent 
of its success is. 
 
The consensus over the male breadwinner wage country  
Similarly, New Zealand’s egalitarianism under the First Labour Government was built 
upon a male breadwinner model, a structural inequality. Political citizenship did not 
ensure women’s equality in the economic order.80 Many commentators, especially 
feminist commentators would argue, paid employment is one of the major attributes 
of full citizenship in twentieth century society—Carole Pateman argues it is the most 
important attribute.81 She stresses the relationship between citizenship and the labour 
market. The New Zealand welfare state was built upon the idea of guaranteeing full 
male employment. Significantly women’s unequal economic citizenship was exposed 
under Labour and the challenge of providing for dependents outside the wage and 
equal pay undermined the male breadwinning consensus from 1946. 
 In the wake of World War II, there was full male employment throughout the 
western world.82 However, Australia and New Zealand were conspicuous in their 
post-war international advocacy of a male breadwinner system. It rested on a political 
pledge for full male employment.83 Clause 35 of the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement (1944) included a resolution to co-operate ‘in achieving full employment 
in Australia and New Zealand’ (Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944). The two 
countries also declared they would co-operate in propagating the policy 
internationally—indeed it was their main ‘article of faith’.84 And true to their word, 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser, and his deputy Walter Nash, for New Zealand and 
External Minister H.V. Evatt for Australia, advocated the full employment policy in 
post-war international forums. Their advocacy was part of the reason was the 
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objective of full [male] employment was written into the United Nations’ (UN) 
Charter, the International Labour Organisation Charter and the Monetary and 
Financial Conference (Bretton Woods) Agreement of 1944.85 Fraser chaired the UN 
Economic and Social Council in 1944 and moved the full employment clause. He 
declared that ‘for the average man the right to live depended on the right to work’.86 
 Most importantly, Australasia was seen to practice what its politicians 
preached. The extent of rehabilitation for returned servicemen was among the highest 
in the allied countries after the war. Returned soldiers had preference of employment 
and full employment became government policy. The New Zealand government’s 
Employment Act 1945 established a National Employment Service ‘for the purpose of 
promoting and maintaining full employment’ and this carried over to the Labour 
Department Act 1954.87 Australia and New Zealand were not the only countries 
urging a post-war full employment world. However many believe that New Zealand 
and Australia came as close as any western countries to achieving ‘pure’ family-wage 
or male breadwinning systems in the post-war years. New Zealand had an 
unemployment rate which did not exceed 0.15 per cent in the 1950s and just 9.7 per 
cent of married women were in paid employment in 1951, which was less than half 
the 21.4 per cent for Britain and 23.2 per cent for the United States in 1951 and 1950 
respectively.88 The government pursued a range of pro-natalist policies in housing, 
family allowance and the lack of childcare for working mothers. Indeed, John Gould 
argued that of all advanced capitalist countries, postwar New Zealand ‘kept its women 
the most rigidly bound to house and to children’.89  
 The New Zealand Labour government was conservative-socialist in 
character.90 Members of the Labour government referred explicitly to their social 
conservatism. In 1944, Finance Minister Walter Nash made his famous statement that 
he was a socialist in the sense that he believed ‘a major responsibility of government 
[was] to provide collectively for the economic welfare and security of the individual’, 
but that he was a conservative in that he looked ‘upon the family as the foundation of 
the nation’.91 It was a vision that assumed men were the breadwinners and women the 
home-makers. Labour sought to create the economic conditions that would guarantee 
to the New Zealand worker that ‘[h]e and his family can have a home and a home life 
with all that those terms imply’.92 The government’s social conservatism was 
expressed over women’s position, housing policies, and the position of Maori.93 
Similarly, in 1959 Keith Sinclair concluded that there was ‘a certain sameness’ about 
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New Zealanders, before adding: ‘if we ignore the Maoris’. His comments on state 
education excluded Catholics. His comments on many developments excluded 
women.94 These exclusions add up.  
 Married women began entering paid employment even within Nash’s time. 
Women went back to the kitchen but did not stay long. One of the election issues of 
1949 was that, due to the economic circumstances and the higher cost of living, 
married women were entering paid employment.95 Despite one of the highest 
standards of living in the world, the post-war state’s ‘family welfare’ policies 
included the rehabilitation of returned servicemen, pro-natalism, housing, family 
benefits and the lack of childcare, women entered paid employment rising from 7.7 
per cent in 1945, 9.7 per cent in 1951, 12.9 in 1956 and 16 per cent in 1961. However, 
there was increasing social commentary upon these trends.96 
 How did this structural inequality come about? The government never saw 
itself as bound by any social contract over the male breadwinner wage. It has its own 
interests that meant that it was not coherent in its support for male breadwinner 
society or the traditional family wage. The state was a self-interested actor as the 
largest single employer in labour markets experiencing serious labour shortage in the 
postwar period. New Zealand was desperate for labour but the state also needed 
labour itself, particularly female workers, as it expanded social security provision. 
Numbers of state-employed clerks, teachers and nurses, all were regarded as 
‘women’s jobs’, grew enormously. As a consequence, the state was prepared to 
jettison its role as an upholder of traditional familial ideology in the process in two 
ways. First, it undermined the male breadwinner wage. The state had accidentally 
undermined the male breadwinner wage in 1926 with the Family Allowance. The 
allowance was a device to avoid an enquiry into the adequacy of the Basic Wage and 
in 1946 the Family Benefit was made universal. This undermined, unwittingly, the 
male breadwinner wage as dependents were being supported in ways other than 
through wages. The state deliberately sanctioned its own female employees having 
equal pay in 1960, a dozen years before private sector won it in 1972. It did so in 
order to recruit and retain staff. Women public servants in New Zealand made up 20 
per cent of women workers who were relatively privileged. 
The state, secondly, sought other labour markets, not just a floating or 
temporary reserve army of labour but permanent new sources of labour to solve the 
postwar labour shortage. The state promoted Maori urbanization, Pacific Island 
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immigration and married women employees. Politicians were passing legislation to 
promote women’s maternal role and supporting Plunket or the Royal New Zealand 
Society for the Health of Women and Children, a government-subsidised infant 
welfare organization which catered for nearly 90 per cent of all babies in the late 
1950s and promoted women’s home role.97 At the same time, other state agents, such 
as the Health Department, was enticing married women into the workforce to be 
nurses. Recruitment campaigns asked married women if their time was ‘fully 
occupied’? The state then is not only self-interested but it is not a single entity; it is a 
set of institutions- a complex ensemble of disparate parts that can and so conflict with 
each other, as occurred in postwar New Zealand over women. Overall the state put a 
higher priority on maintaining labour market than it is did over discriminating against 
women in workforce.  
The Labour government was said to have implemented policies designed to 
ensure the material well-being of the traditional family and, in the process, to ‘uphold 
the ideal of the nuclear family with a full-time mother and a male breadwinner’.98 But 
the male breadwinner wage society began to fracture during the Labour government’s 
watches 1935-1949 and 1957-1960, exposing differentials between males and 
females. A conservative socialist government established its welfare state and, at the 
same time, initiated a struggle over domesticity, unwittingly drawing attention to a 
female underclass that was not treated as well as men.  
 
The traditional working class 
Clearly the provision of education increased but this was not a vehicle for 
egalitarianism: it underwrote segmentation in the workforce. The numbers of women 
in paid employment dramatically increased over the course of the twentieth century. 
But work changed and occupational profiles altered in other ways. Over the twentieth 
century, the labour supply to domestic service declined as women joined the paid 
labour force in other, better-paid, work. There was an increase in the proportion of 
women in paid employment in every census from the 1870s except during World War 
One, just after World War Two and with the specific exception of Maori women’s 
participation in the interwar period. By 2005 women made up 47 per cent or nearly 
half the workforce. The experience of paid work became normal for young single 
women between the 1870s and 1939. In 1870, most young women were not in paid 
employment; by the time of the Second World War, most were. On the other hand, 
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the paid employment of married women ‘became normal’ after 1939. The proportion 
of blue-collar male workers seems to have been in slow-moving decline. At the same 
time there was an increase in white-collar workers in general and female white-collar 
jobs in particular. By the 1970s, women made up 70 per cent of clerical workers and 
New Zealand had become a ‘white-collar society’. But women remained 
disproportionately in the lower echelons of white-collar employment and men 
disproportionately represented in management. 
    The expansion of professional work was the second most significant 
occupational development of the late twentieth century and it too involved processes 
of segmentation. The proportion of New Zealanders in the workforce recorded as 
clerks, sales and service workers had grown to over 28 per cent by 2001. At the same 
time, the number of ‘professionals’ had also quietly but more sharply grown. By 
2001, 14.5 per cent of those in paid employment were professionals (not counting 
‘legislators, administrators and managers’, many of whom would describe themselves 
as professionals).99 In addition a relatively new category ‘associated professionals’ or 
‘semi-professionals’ emerged. It is estimated that semi-professionals made up 6.7 per 
cent of the urban occupational structure in 1901. By 2001 nearly 12 per cent of all 
those in employment were associate professionals.100 Arguably, by the end of the 
twentieth century, nearly one-in-three workers was a professional ‘aspiring 
professional’, as society in general became more professional.101 Professional 
hierarchies emerged in places spanning from top to bottom of society, as more 
occupations became subject to specialized training. To some extent, professional 
hierarchies subsumed some white-collar workers, too. For instance, a medical 
hierarchy included administrators, professionals like doctors, emerging or semi-
professionals like nurses and midwives, as well as white-collar clerks. Relations 
between groups of professions became more important.102 For instance, the ‘state of 
modern medicine has more to do with the state of modern nursing, pharmacy, law and 
accounting’, and the relations between these groups in a hierarchy, than with that of 
nineteenth-century doctors or medicine.103 
 Professionalization was not evenly experienced by women, Maori or by people 
from different regions. The proportion of professionals who were women grew within 
a century from one per cent to fifty per cent. However, today, women ‘remain 
significantly under-represented in leadership positions and over-represented in lower-
paid professional jobs’. This phenomenon, known as the ‘glass ceiling’, is 
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accentuated because women are generally relegated to the bottom of professional 
hierarchies as clerks and support staff, too, with important exceptions.104  
 But Maori were not as well-placed as women.105 By 2001, the proportion of 
Maori working as ‘legislators, administrators and managers’, professionals, or 
technicians and associate professionals only increased from 6.7 per cent in 1991 to 7.6 
per cent in 2001. Three times as many Pacific Islanders as Maori were employed in 
these occupations in 2001 (18 per cent of Pacific males and 27 per cent of Pacific 
women). Professionals were less likely to be in rural areas while among the urban 
areas: Wellington the capital was the most professionalized city in New Zealand.106  
 So the traditional working class was once dominated by skilled and unskilled 
male Pakeha workers. It diversified and changed out of sight in a process beginning at 
least in the nineteenth-century. New Zealand labour history has concentrated upon the 
period 1880s to 1930s, blue-collar workers, working-class communities and 
equalitarianism.107 There has been too little focus on how the traditional working class 
and urban worlds changed over time. It is not just that labour history is weak for the 
period from the 1940s but also economic and political history. The transition to more 
complex late twentieth-century labour markets appears sudden because so little work 
has traced the longer-time processes. Importantly, a small Maori middle class and a 
growing female middle class have emerged to complicate the picture. Up until the 
1970s many Maori and women were an ‘underclass’, without educational and 
employment opportunities, indeed, outside paid employment. Upward social mobility 
of any women or Maori is not part of the New Zealand’s egalitarian narrative. 
 
Conclusion: relative egalitarianism and international comparisons 
Countries exude powerful self-images; New Zealand’s particular attachment has been 
to an ideal of its own egalitarianism and consensus. Also typically, this particular 
New Zealand image draws upon a rich amalgam of truth and myth. Yet the realities 
have changed. Over the past century inequality has grown, and a new nostrum might 
now apply: once egalitarian does not mean always egalitarian. From the dramatic 
pressures placed upon Maori society, to the inequality between wage workers, and in 
the gaps between men and women, divisions have expressed themselves in 
demographic and socio-economic indices such as life expectancy and wealth. The 
‘decline’ was long and involved. If we take class, race and gender into account, 
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questions have to be asked about the universality of the social laboratory, consensus 
and equalitarianism in the first instance. 
 The myth is easier to establish than the reality. A. A. Congalton and R. J. 
Havighurst discovered that ‘any attempt to enquire into the existence of social 
distinctions within the community invariably roused resentment’.108 Congalton’s 1946 
survey of Wellington boys’ secondary school attitudes, particularly in regard to class 
consciousness, was described by the Truth newspaper as ‘improper’, ‘snobbish and 
undemocratic’, ‘a new snooping level in its pernicious probe into the private affairs of 
the people’. Others noted that New Zealanders were ‘shocked and resentful’ when 
their attention was drawn to social differences.109 The 1960 Hunn report which 
pointed to racial disparities in housing, educational attainment, criminal convictions 
and employment and income was glossed over.110 Popular literature noted the extent 
of conformity, ‘everybody moved in the same direction’ and the social structure 
version pointed to a very small gap between rich and poor, Maori or Pakeha or at least 
narrowing.111 All contrary evidence was censored. The best example of this is the 
censoring of the Ans Westra’s photos of poor living conditions of Maori in the School 
Journal in 1964. The New Zealand Department of Education withdrew and destroyed 
38,000 copies of Washday at the Pa, at the request of the Maori Women’s Welfare 
League. The booklet, illustrated by Westra’s photos, revealed a loving family living in 
poverty without running water or electricity.112 This past reluctance to record any 
inequality is compounded by the systematic destruction of census data and the politics 
of counting which saw women and Maori often under-estimated even after World 
War Two. 
 Above all there remains a sneaking suspicion that, despite all challenges, 
surely New Zealand was relatively egalitarian? Until the 1970s, it was felt, the 
country had a more equitable social structure than most other societies.113 Neville 
Kirk’s comparative point about the national imprint of workers and their 
organizations on state structures and national culture is salient (even if he does fall 
into the usual trap of lumping New Zealand and Australia together).114 More broadly, 
New Zealand historians have just begun to engage with the exceptionalist debate. 
Labour history once emphasised differences between countries emphasizing the 
‘exceptional’ nature of each. Every nation and its labour history was distinct. 
Recently labour historians have returned to the ‘exceptionalist debate’ to emphasise 
similarities globally and transnationalism. But only certain themes are being 
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compared especially in New Zealand’s case, arcadian and progressive utopianisms.115 
The egalitarian narrative involving social equality, classlessness and consensus has 
been central to the New Zealand people’s sense of themselves and how others have 
viewed New Zealand. Recently commentators have concentrated upon inequality. 
However, the earlier concentration on egalitarianism, combined with comparisons 
within the Empire have been pervasive and blind historians still to the distinctions 
within New Zealand’s society, particularly from 1935 to 1975.116 
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